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The opening up of the UK residential electricity sector in 1999 prompted several studies 
of the impact this had on both the level and structuring of retail charges, and on 
incumbent players’ market power. Drawing on observations of regional tariffs for the 
month of January 2004, this paper supports previous conclusions based on simulated 
retail charges, looking at the response of real tariffs to distribution and transmission 
costs, customer density, and the length of low voltage underground circuit. We also 
investigate whether vertically integrated suppliers have a particular effect on charges 
ceteris paribus the effect of cost drivers and supplier-related factors.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The GB residential electricity market was opened to competition in May 1999. This had an 
immediate impact on the level of tariffs and services offered to consumers. The wave of 
mergers and acquisitions which followed raised concerns about the potential detrimental 
effect on end-customers. Although much research has been devoted to switching behaviour 
(Giulietti  et  al., 2006; Waterson, 2003; Ofgem, 2001, 2002, 2003), third-degree price 
discrimination and incumbents’ market power (Otero and Waddams Price, 2001), little 
information is available about the effect of ownership structures on tariffs.  
 
Oligopoly models show that the proposition that a merger enables firms to exploit 
economies of scale is not convincing if the merger does not also generate technical 
synergies. These synergies would lead to lower charges to customers (Spector, 2003; 
see also references herein). A study by Azzam and Rosebaum (2001) which considers 
the link between efficiency to concentration points out however that it is difficult to 
discriminate empirically between collusion and cost-efficiency as variables relating to 
price and profitability. The retail electricity market is a case in point, as high switching 
costs favour collusive behaviour, thus maintaining high prices. 
 
Using 2002 price data Salies and Waddams Price (2004) examine similarities between 
the effects of brand coefficients on retail electricity prices within existing ownership 
groups but find that evidence of this is weak. Relying on tariffs levels from January 
2004, the present paper contributes to the discussion by highlighting the effect of 
mergers on tariffs in a more efficient way. We test for the specific average effect of 
several ownership groups on regional electricity retail charges after controlling for cost 
drivers, economies of scale and customer density. Particular attention is given to the 
effect of the creation of EDF Energy, the merged London Electricity and SEEBOARD 
group of companies. In broad terms, we conjecture that if technical synergies exist 
between distribution networks owned by EDF Energy (situated in contiguous regions: 
London, East and South-East England), they should result in lower prices.  
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This paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the changes in ownership 
structures that occurred in the GB electricity sector between May 2002 and January 
2004. We focus on the probable effect of these changes on the degree of competition 
and remaining incumbents’ market power. We then introduce data, an econometric 
model and the hypotheses to be tested in section III. Results are given and discussed in 
section IV, before the conclusion in section V. 
 
2. Changes in market structure 
 
The ownership structure of each supplier is summarised in Table 1 compared with that 
of April-May 2002, being the period analysed by Salies and Waddams Price (2004). A 
more detailed picture of the ownership structures of residential distributors and 
suppliers in GB as at January 2004 is given in the Table  4 (see also Electricity 
Association, 2003a, b). At the intersection of any given row and column one can see 
whether a supplier (row) is an incumbent in the distribution region (column). A supplier 
may not be present in the selected region, as is the case for Basic Power.  
 
Concentration increased from April 2002 as a result of acquisitions, with at the most five 
ex-Public Electricity Suppliers and three new entrants in most areas, in addition to internet 
and other suppliers (ex-Public Electricity Suppliers, hereafter “ex-PES”, are also known as 
Regional Electricity Companies). Almost all suppliers operate in the 14 distribution regions 
that make us England, Scotland and Wales. For reasons unknown to the authors, Basic 
Power was not operating in Scotland at the time of the study, which remains the case.  
 
In April 2004 Scottish Hydro Electric-Southern Electric (SSE) acquired Atlantic Electric and 
Gas. Powergen purchased TXU’s British generation and retail operations. These mergers 
raise competition concerns although they may have different detrimental effects given that 
they involve firms with significantly different market shares. A merger between two firms, 
each with relatively high market share, may have less impact on competition than one in 
which a large supplier merges with a smaller rival (RBB, 2002).   
The magnitude of the coefficient applied to the ownership group dummies in comparison with 
the coefficient of other groups will help us to test the data for particular merger effects.
1 
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3. Data and econometric model 
 
The retail charges pertain to 14 regions, with up to eight brand names per region. We 
consider here a single payment method (standard credit) at three levels of consumption. 
The distribution charges were taken from distributors’ published statements of charges 
for connection to and use of the distribution system (Ofgem, 2004). Constituting 15-
30% of a customer’s final bill, these vary across the distribution regions according to 
the charges levied by the local distribution company, but are levied in the same manner 
to all suppliers using that distribution network. Generally the tariffs have two 
components: a charge per consumer and a charge per unit of electricity carried. We note 
that prepayment distribution charges differ from credit and direct debit charges.
2 
Transmission charges form approximately 13% of the invoice and vary from region to 
region. Charge levels are taken from the National Grid Transco web site (see National 
Grid Transco, 2003), and are those levied for the period 16:00 hours to 19:00 hours. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.  
 
For each level of consumption q = 1650, 3300, and 4950 kWh, we estimate the 
following model: 
(1)   () () ( ) 12 3 4 5 6 rj r r r r rj g gj rj
g
cq dq tq n u i o α αα α αα =+ + + + + ε + ∑  
where indices r and j denote distribution region and supplier, respectively. The payment 
method is standard credit. “(q)” specifies variables the value of which varies with q.
3 In 
addition: 
crj = retail charge in region r from supplier j  
dr = distribution charge in region r  
tr = transmission charge in region r 
nr = total number of distribution customers per km
2 in region r (density) 
ur = length of underground circuit in region r 
irj = 1 if supplier j is the incumbent in region r; 0 otherwise (incumbency dummy) 
ogj = 1 if supplier j belongs to ownership group g; 0 otherwise (group dummy) 
 
6 Mergers in the GB electricity market: effects on retail charges 
We estimate three regression equations, one for each simulated level of annual demand, 
relating retail charges to the cost elements which we could identify, to market 
characteristics and to incumbency and group dummies. 
 
Salies and Waddams Price (2004) estimated a model similar to (1) with brand instead of 
group dummies. Brand dummies capture any effect of suppliers reflected in tariffs 
(including costs of purchasing electricity). Our model gives us an opportunity to test 
whether suppliers that are not vertically integrated with other market participants tend to 
price less compared with integrated suppliers. In this model we replaced brand dummies 
with fewer group dummies that measure the impact on retail charges of the various 
ownership groups present in the market at the time of the analysis. There are five 
mutually exclusive ownership groups: Powergen, Scottish Hydro Electric and Southern 
Electric, Scottish Power, EDF Energy, and Innogy, plus the three non-ex-PES 
companies, as listed in Table 1.  
 
Given the findings of Salies and Waddams Price (2004), we expect costs variations 
across regions to be closely mirrored in tariff variations ( 1 α  to be close to 1, and  2 α  not 
exceeding one third, reflecting the shorter consumption period to which transmission 
charges correspond). We allow for both the number of customers and the distribution 
area using a ratio of the two. It is expected that denser (urbanised) areas allow suppliers 
to reduce per-customer marketing costs for a given network size, which would be 
indicated by a negative value for  3 α . The length of low voltage underground circuit is 
used as a proxy for the size of the network. Underground circuit length has a very close 
correlation to the number of distribution customers (the correlation coefficient equals 
0.88). Its effect on charges shall be measured by  4 α . A negative value for this 
coefficient would more generally indicate economies of scale.  
 
The additional power of incumbents (the ex-PES), who had retained a market share of 
between 50% and 85%, would be reflected in higher tariffs and a positive coefficient for 
the incumbency dummy,  5 α . A positive and significant value for this coefficient may 
reflect the positive costs of switching from one ex-PES to another. 
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Using data from April 2002, Salies and Waddams Price (2004) test for heterogeneity 
between suppliers by examining the significance of brand dummy coefficients. Here, we 
test the hypothesis of whether vertical integration has a relatively significant effect on 
charges using . Unlike the previous study which relied on signs of the estimated 
coefficients on brand dummies, the present analysis shows some improvement as it 
statistically tests for the significance of group dummy coefficients; group dummies 
replace brand dummies. We note that our model may be seen as a constrained version of 
a model with brand dummies.  
6 α
 
We have not included a constant; thus, no base group is considered. This allows us to 
avoid near-colinearity problems and vacuous interpretation of the constant. Following 
the Salies and Waddams Price (2004) we estimated a two-equation seemingly unrelated 
regression equation (SURE) model for standard and direct debit tariffs. We only report 
results of the standard credit equation.  
 
As there is a possibility of non-constant residual variance within each equation resulting 
from the spatial dimension of our data, we tested for conditional heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form within each equation using White’s (1980) test. We reject 
homoskedasticity at the 5% level of significance in the direct debit equation at 
1650kWh. We may interpret this result as a stronger attempt from supply businesses to 
differentiate their tariffs in this market. As will be shown later, this result shows 
regional incumbents still enjoy market power, particularly in the direct debit market 
where most switching has occurred. The model’s coefficients are reported in Table 3.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
First we consider the responses of retail charges to distribution and transmission 
charges. As expected, the coefficient on distribution charges is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level of significance. If we assume a 95% confidence interval 
centred about one, distribution costs are almost fully passed on to customers, except in 
the direct debit and prepayment equations at 1650kWh. With regard to transmission 
charges, our results are also similar to Salies and Waddams Price (2004), with a 
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coefficient about one third due to the short consumption period to which these charges 
correspond (peak period from 16:00 to 19:00 hours). If in each equation at 3300kWh we 
multiply by three the estimated coefficient on the transmission variable then we obtain a 
value that ranges from about 0.7 to 0.8.  
 
We find economies of density at 1650 kWh and less significantly at 3300 kW. Closely 
related, the negative impact on retail charges of the length of the underground circuit in 
all markets would reflect economies of scale: a customer’s bill is lower in distribution 
regions that have more kilometres of circuit underground. The low significance of the 
coefficient applied to density might result from the excessive correlation between this 
variable and circuit’s length variables. The existence of those economies leads us to 
reject the hypothesis that urban and rural customers benefit equally from competition. In 
any event, NAO (2001, p.8) reported that rural customers are less likely to change their 
electricity supplier than those who live in urban areas because many customers change 
their supplier in response to a visit from a sales agent, and direct marketing of electricity 
has so far been less intensive in rural areas.  
 
This negative relationship between retail charges and both the size of the network and 
the number of customers per km
2 reflects first technical economies at the distribution 
stage: heavy investments create an incentive for distributors to spread their costs among 
a large number of connected households. This situation could support the increasing 
concentration through horizontal integration in the retail sector; given the existence of 
decreasing per customer distribution charges paid by suppliers, they have an interest in 
servicing a large number of customers. The two-component structure of distribution 
tariffs in all but the Sweb regions implies technical economies of scale, in that the “per 
unit” distribution charge necessarily decreases when the amount of energy supplied to 
consumers increases.  
 
As expected, Atlantic Electric and Gas and Basic Power have the lowest impact on 
charges with potential average annual savings (see Waterson, 2003) of up to £50, as 
between the cheapest and the most expensive supplier. Note that these savings do not 
account for consumer perception of switching costs. This difference was highest in the 
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direct debit market at 4950kWh (we do not report this result). Conversely, the effect of 
Innogy and Powergen groups on charges is greater or equal to the average effect. This 
seems consistent with integrated suppliers charging higher prices raising competition 
concerns. It is well known that the existence of consumer switching costs creates a 
further incentive for firms to grab more customers, which necessarily gives an 
advantage to older suppliers in the market (Farrell and Klemperer, 2004).  
Ofgem (2003, p.38) reports that more households are switching to non-prepayment 
markets and low-income customers switch less often. 
 
Interestingly, EDF Energy group has, on average, a lower impact on charges than SSE 
and Innogy. We suspect a more efficient vertically integrated structure and pricing 
strategy. Note that EDF Energy includes the Seeboard and Eastern distribution businesses 
that are in neighbouring regions. It is worth noting, as Spector (2003) emphasises, that the 
proposition that a merger allows firms to exploit economies of scale is not convincing if 
the merger does not also generate technical synergies, through learning for example. 
Technical synergies may exist between distribution networks owned by EDF Energy 
because they are in contiguous regions (London, the East and South East). In addition, 
EDF Energy holds generation assets, giving it the ability to bypass the volatile and often 
illiquid electricity exchanges in order to hedge its customer base. 
 
SSE also seems efficient at low consumption levels compared with Powergen, Scottish 
Power, Innogy and British Gas, but overall less efficient than the EDF Energy group. 
Unlike this latter entity, SSE owns very distant networks, one in Scotland and the other 
in the South of England, which, in accordance with our previous discussion, would not 





Using regional observations on tariffs offered in December 2003, the present paper set out 
to investigate the particular effect of various integrated structures on the relationship 
between annual retail charges and cost drivers. We find evidence of different pricing 
10 Mergers in the GB electricity market: effects on retail charges 
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strategies by the various ownership groups, which suggests that the effect on retail charges 
of integrated suppliers varies depending on the spatial dispersion of the merged networks.  
 
Overall these results support Salies and Waddams Price (2003, 2004) who also pointed 
out the negative (respectively positive) effect on unit rates and bills of a change in the 
number of customers (respectively the distribution area). Our density variable, however, 
provides a more flexible interpretation as the particular influence on charges in rural 
(less dense) areas proves to be significant. Alongside this variable, the size of the 
underground network leads to a similar result as the number of customers: coefficient 
estimates range from –0.7 to –0.3. For example, if the underground circuit increases by 
3,000 km, then retail charges would decrease by £1 in the standard credit market at 
1,650kWh. 
 
We could bring more information to the discussion by extending the range of 
consumption levels considered or using longitudinal data. This would have the further 
advantage of increasing the number of observations for brands such as Manweb, SWEB, 
Swalec, and Seeboard.  
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P. For Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro regions, we employed data from the 2002-03 period as 
this was the only data available to us in the appropriate format (p/kWh) when completing the 
present study. Prepayment distribution standing charges were replaced with their non-
prepayment equivalent when the data was missing, which occurs in four regions. At 1,650kWh, 
this substitution is fairly accurate, as the extra charge for prepayment customers does not exceed 
£10, i.e. 15% of distribution charges (or less than 3% of retail charges).  
P
3
P. Given the non-linear structure of most tariffs offered by network utilities (see Wilson, 1997), 
these models have some advantage over models considering a single mean level of 
consumption. V.-Cervera and J-Málaga (2001) and Ofgem’s works also consider more than one 
level of annual demand. This methodology is appropriate as most tariffs intersect at some level 
of consumption reflecting various pricing strategies and tactics to attract targeted consumers; 
some suppliers prefer to target low energy demand customers while others offer attractive tariffs 
to customers whose annual demand exceeds an average level known to suppliers. 
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April 2002  January 2004 
Ex-PES 
London Electricity (SWEB)  EDF Energy (London Energy, SWEB 




ScottishPower (Manweb)  ScottishPower (Manweb) 
Npower (Northern, Yorkshire)  Npower (Northern, Yorkshire) 
UScottish Hydro Electric and Southern ElectricU   
   (SWALEC) 
UScottish Hydro Electric and Southern ElectricU 
   (SWALEC) 
Powergen  Powergen (Eastern, Norweb) 
TXU-Europe (Eastern, Norweb)   
Non ex-PES 
Amerada, Atlantic Electric and Gas, Utility 
Link (Basic Power), British Gas 
P
(c)
P Atlantic Electric and Gas, Utility Link 
(Basic Power), British Gas 
(a) Mergers are underlined, and acquisitions represented with parentheses, with the name 
of the owner before the parenthesis. 
(b) LE Group completed its acquisition of SEEBOARD in July 2002. Before that date, 
SEEBOARD was held by American Electric Power. It became SEEBOARD Energy Ltd in 
2002. LE Group changed its name to EDF Energy in 2003, and its supply brand, London 
Electricity, changed its name to London Energy.  
(c) Amerada became part of Powergen and was re-branded Powergen in 2003. 
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Total charge per annum for standard credit        
  1650 kWh   14 593  1244  12 300  17 900 
  3300 kWh   24 553  1906  21 100  29 500 
  4950 kWh   34 520  2927  29 700  42 000 
Total charge per annum for direct debit          
  1650 kWh   13 470  1145  11 400  16 300 
  3300 kWh   23 215  2036  19 300  28 000 
  4950 kWh   32 939  19 077  27 200  39 700 
Total charge per annum for prepayment        
  1650 kWh   15 922  1885  11 800  22 000 
  3300 kWh   26 547  2308  21 900  33 900 
  4950 kWh   37 187  2890  31 000  45 900 
        
Distribution charge per annum, non prepayment        
  1650 kWh pa  3793  632  2687  4735 
  3300 kWh pa  5919  1079  4275  7933 
  4950 kWh pa  8044  1732  5720  11 449 
Distribution charge per annum for prepayment        
  1650 kWh pa  4045  891  2687  5833 
  3300 kWh pa  6170  1128  4275  7933 
  4950 kWh pa  8296  1680  5720  11 449 
        
Transmission charge per annum        
  1650 kWh   2009  957  136  3478 
  3300 kWh   4018  1915  272  6956 
  4950 kWh   6028  2873  409  10 434 
        
Distribution customers, 000 
  1961 679  673  3381 
Size of distribution area, in kmP
2 
P 
  15 928  11 300  667  54 500 
Density (distribution customers / kmP
2
P) 356  780  12  3124 
Underground circuit (km)  22 081  8466  8917  36 302 
(a) Charges are inclusive of VAT.   Mergers in the GB electricity market: effects on retail charges 
17 
Table 3.  Standard Credit; Dependent variable: annual bill 
  Annual consumption 
  1650kWh
   3300kWh
   4950  kWh 
 
Distribution  Charge  .86 ***  1.03  ***  .89 *** 
  (.12)   (.07)   (.07)  
Transmission  Charge  .54 ***  .26 ***  .16 *** 
  (.08)   (.03)   (.03)  
Density (customers / kmP
2
PPP) –.23 **  –.16 *  –.20  
  (.09)   (.08)   (.13)  
Underground Lines (×1000)  –.32 ***  –.38 ***  –.69 *** 
 (.09)
   (.09)
   (.13)
   
Incumbent  7.51  ***  18.69 ***  29.74 *** 
 (2.64)
   (1.82)
   (2.63)
   
Suppliers (£) 
     
   
Sempra Energy, etc. (Atlantic 
Electric and Gas) 
101.46 ***  167.07 ***  256.51 *** 
  (7.65)   (6.41)   (8.16)  
Utility Link (Basic Power)  116.68  ***  176.89  ***  260.51  *** 
  (7.64)   (6.34)   (8.06)  
Powergen  111.06 ***  191.49 ***  296.07 *** 
  (7.44)   (6.40)   (8.14)  
SSE  104.51 ***  182.75 ***  284.68 *** 
  (7.46)   (6.43)   (8.19)  
Scottish  Power  119.88 ***  186.18 ***  276.83 *** 
  (7.44)   (6.40)   (8.15)  
EDF  Energy  103.30 ***  175.69 ***  272.72 *** 
  (7.48)   (6.44)   (8.20)  
Innogy  111.94 ***  182.27 ***  286.07 *** 
  (7.58)   (6.40)   (8.14)  
Centrica  (British  Gas)  113.74 ***  179.28 ***  270.44 *** 
  (7.45)   (6.41)   (8.16)  
Adj.  2 R   .731   .909   .919  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ‘*’ = significant at the 10% level. ‘**’ = significant at 
the 5% level. ‘***’ = significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.  Ownership structure in the UK residential electricity market at December 2003
Aquila Inc. Owned Investor Investor Owned
First E. Corp. Private Owned Owned Private
EDF EDF Scottish Aquila Sterling Mid United SSE Power Scottish EDF SSE Power Mid
Energy Energy Power First Energy American Utilities Distribution Power Energy Distribution American
EDF East EDF Scottish Northern United Scottish H. Scottish EDF Southern Western Western Yorkshire
Energy Midlands Energy Power Aquila Electric Utilities Electric Power Power Energy Electric Power Power Power Electric
Networks Electric Networks Manweb Networks Distribution Electric Distribution Distribution Networks Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
EPN EME LPN SP Manweb Aquila NEDL United Utilities S+S SP Distribution SPN S+S WPD WPD YEDL
Ultimate Region Scottish Scottish South Yorkshire
Owner Owner  Supplier Hydro Power East and Humber























basicpower EEEE E E E N N E E E E E
British Gas E E E EEE E E EEE EEE
Number of Suppiers 8 8 8 888 8 7 788 888
I = Incumbent, E = Entrant, N = Neither.  
(a) SSE counts for one supplier
Manweb region = Merseyside, Cheshire, North Wales.  Scottish Hydro region = North Scotland.  Scottish Power region = South and Central Scotland
Utility Link
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